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Luncheon Address
After the Independent Counsel Act:
Where Do We Go from Here?
by
JAMES K. ROBINSON*
Everyone who gets the call from Washington to come and serve
their country hopes that at the end of their allotted brief span, they
will be able to look back and feel that some good was accomplished,
and that they did more than just tread water and mark time. Just a
short time ago, in 1998, I was no different. Since my service as United
States Attorney in Detroit during the Carter Administration, I had
felt that my ideal job with the Justice Department would be the one I
am privileged to hold today. As I prepared to take on the job during
the spring of 1998, I mulled over ideas for new federal initiatives
against novel forms of crime in our increasingly international and
technologically interconnected world; I ruminated over management
improvements for the nearly 1,000 employees in the Criminal
Division who soon would be under my supervision; I dreamed about
forging new working relationships with the 94 United States
Attorneys Offices and among the various federal, state, and local law
enforcement organizations.
Little did I know before I arrived that I would be walking into
the waning days of a two decade experiment-the Independent
Counsel Act'-an experiment that would eat the hours of my days
and nights with a voracious appetite that seemed to know no bounds.
I initially approached the question of the future of the Act with an
open mind. My tilt, if any, would have been toward the notion that
the statute was an appropriate vehicle to deal with conflicts inherent
in having the Department of Justice conduct investigations of very
* Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice. I
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1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (2000).
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high level members of the administration. Had I been pressed to take
a position, I would have described myself as being in the "mend it"
rather than "end it" camp. I was surprised to find that I would look
back a year later and regard the demise of that experiment with a
sense of great accomplishment, as a hallmark in the annals of good
government. "
The Independent Counsel Act became law in 19782 while I was
the United States Attorney in Detroit. It was a grand experiment,
embarked upon during the post-Watergate era of reform and high
resolve. The experiment was designed to ensure that allegations of
criminal conduct against the highest level executive branch officials,
those as to whom it might reasonably be presumed that the Justice
Department would have a conflict of interest to investigate or
prosecute, were handled by an outside Independent Counsel, with a
statutory source of authority independent of the Justice Department.
Throughout its history, the Act proved to be a lightning rod for
criticism, but Congress reauthorized the Act three times3 during the
ensuing two decades, and the Supreme Court, notwithstanding a
prescient dissent by Justice Scalia, concluded it passed constitutional
muster in Morrison v. Olson.4 Nevertheless, during the last few years,
thoughtful observers within and without the government, both
Republicans and Democrats and from all along the political spectrum,
began to come together in a consensus that the Act was in fact a
failed experiment that had not and could not work to achieve its
fundamental goal of enhancing public confidence in the impartial
administration of justice.
As time for a fourth reauthorization of the Act approached,5 the
Justice Department, after careful deliberation and much internal
discussion, formally took the position that the Act should be allowed
to die.6 At the same time, the mood of the press and the people had
become markedly opposed to the Act, and the few efforts in Congress
to legislate a continuation of any system of Independent Counsels
fizzled. On June 30, 1999, within a week of my first anniversary in
2. See The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824
(1978).
3. The Act was amended in 1983, 1987, and 1994. See Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat.
2039 (1983); Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (1987); Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732
(1994).
4. See 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988).
5. June 30,1999. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (2000).
6. See Hearing on the Reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act Before the
House Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law, Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 1st Sess. (March 2, 1999) (prepared statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy
Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice); Hearing on the Independent Counsel Act Before
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. (March 17, 1999) (prepared
statement of Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice).
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office, the former Independent Counsel Act lapsed,7 and a well-
meaning but flawed experiment came to an end.
That same day, the Attorney General approved new Department
of Justice regulations designed to bring some order and regularity to
the procedures that would be used when matters arise that would
create a conflict of interest for the Department.8 In rejecting the
structure of the Act, however, none of us intended to turn our backs
on the important lessons of the Watergate scandal. First, we
understood that there are some criminal investigations of very high
level executive branch and Department of Justice officials that cannot
credibly be handled by the Department of Justice through its ordinary
investigative and prosecutorial procedures. In such cases the
perceived conflict of interest would be so great that public confidence
in the fairness and thoroughness of the investigation simply could not
be achieved. Watergate certainly was such a case, and others have
occurred from time to time throughout our history, though the
number is far smaller than the number of cases that the Independent
Counsel Act removed from the Department's hands.
Second, we recognized that a clear, orderly set of procedures,
thought out in advance and based on our substantial experience with
outside investigations under the Act, was vital to provide structure
and consistency to our consideration of these politically charged and
deeply sensitive matters as they arose. It was important not to leave
the system adrift, as it had been before the enactment of the
Independent Counsel Act, leaving us to react to a crisis situation with
a crisis response. Therefore, we set about to draft a set of regulations
flexible enough to enable appropriate individualized responses to the
infinite array of situations that can arise, but structured enough to
provide a buffer to ad hoc, poorly thought out reactions that create
more problems than they solve.
I. The Problems of the Independent Counsel Act
With these two lessons in mind, I will share some of the
experiences and frustrations I encountered with the Independent
Counsel Act that led me to conclude that the Act was in fundamental
tension with the processes of good government and that it should be
ended rather than mended. Unfortunately, many of the events that
led me to my conclusions are still confidential, and I am unable to talk
or answer questions about them. Nevertheless, I think I can give you
enough detail to explain my conversion. I then will outline the
procedures that the Attorney General has put in place in the new
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 599.
8. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1-600.10 (2000). For background and discussion of these
regulations, see Office of Special Counsel, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,038-37,042 (1999).
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regulations to address the very real conflicts of interest that can exist
within the Department of Justice when criminal allegations arise
involving very high level executive branch officials, the conflicts that
led to the Watergate crisis and that persuaded Congress two decades
ago that the Independent Counsel Act was necessary.
Let me begin with a few caveats. First of all, whatever you may
have read or heard about tensions between the various Independent
Counsels and the Department of Justice, I firmly came to believe that
the structural weaknesses of the Act were the problem, not individual
failures or personalities. The Independent Counsels who have served
during my tenure in the Justice Department have made significant
sacrifices to carry out the responsibilities charged to them, and have
performed a public service at considerable personal cost.
A further caveat is that neither I nor anyone else at the
Department of Justice is foolish enough to think that we have solved
the riddle and come up with the perfect solution in the regulations the
Attorney General adopted in 1999.9 Instead, we have all learned
painful lessons in a fundamental truth of democratic governance; first,
there are no solutions to some dilemmas, and second, the answers
that are there are never neat and tidy with all the corners tucked in
and the bows tied. We have all had reinforced for us the basic truth
that democracy is a messy business. Perhaps H.L. Mencken was right
when he observed: "there's always an easy solution to every human
problem: neat, plausible and wrong."
In 1978, however, Congress believed that it had found the
solution to the problem posed by Watergate. There was a great wave
of legislation designed to reform government in the 1970s. Election
crimes, conflicts of interest, tax information secrecy, and financial
disclosure by public officials all received congressional attention.
Among the reforms were the special prosecutor provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978,10 which established a new
framework for the handling of investigations involving the highest
level executive branch officials, a framework that would survive for
the next two decades.
The Act seemed simple in concept. First, it identified a group of
individuals in particular positions, for the most part composed of
Cabinet Members, White House aides, and Justice Department
officials, including me, who became known as "covered persons.""1
Congress concluded that investigation of criminal allegations against
any of these people would presumptively create a conflict of interest
9. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1-600.10.
10. See Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 591 (b) (2000).
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for the Department. 12 Then, it mandated that an Independent
Counsel from outside government be appointed by a special panel of
federal judges to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute any
allegation against these individuals, unless the Department of Justice,
in the course of a brief preliminary investigation, had established that
there were no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation
was warranted. 13  Take note that the standard required the
Department to prove a negative, always a difficult proposition, and
certainly one alien to normal decision making in criminal law
enforcement. To ensure that the Independent Counsel would have
sufficient authority to do a thorough job, the Act required that the
special panel of judges grant broad jurisdiction to the new
Independent Counsel, covering not only the allegation referred by the
Attorney General, but "all matters related to" that allegation and all
matters arising out of the Independent Counsel's jurisdiction.14
At that point, a new Independent Counsel was launched, with a
virtually unlimited budget, no time limits, and an amorphous, broad
jurisdictional mandate. Furthermore, he or she reported to no one,
and his or her decisions were neither reviewed nor approved by
anyone. Neither the courts nor the Department of Justice-indeed,
no federal officer, elected or appointed-had the authority to
supervise the Independent Counsel's conduct or actions, except in the
hypothetical event that he or she engaged in such gross misconduct as
to require that the Attorney General fire him or her.15 While
Independent Counsels were in theory bound to follow established
departmental policies, the vast majority of prosecutorial policies that
guide the exercise of discretion by federal prosecutors are both
unwritten and deliberately flexible, to accommodate a variety of
potential situations, and are ill-suited to guide the decision making of
anyone outside the system. Thus there were few practical checks of
any sort on the men and women who served as Independent
Counsels.
My role as the head of the Criminal Division, charged with
preparing a recommendation for the Attorney General as to how
allegations against statutory covered persons should be handled, and
with coordinating with and assisting Independent Counsels after their
appointment, provided me with a unique opportunity quickly to gain
exposure to this controversial Act. Indeed, exposure, after exposure,
after exposure. From my first month in office in 1998, until the
expiration of the Act, I supervised the handling of no less than nine
12. See S. REP. No. 95-170 at 53 (1978).
13. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 592-593.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1).
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full-fledged inquiries pursuant to the Act.
Perhaps my strongest feeling about the whole process was that
administration of the Act required an extraordinary expenditure of
time and energy by high-level Justice Department personnel. By its
very existence, the Act warped out of all proportion the handling of
minor, even petty matters that under any other circumstance would
have been quickly and appropriately resolved by career prosecutors.
Its procedures required the devotion of countless hours of time at the
very highest levels of the Department of Justice to resolve each of
these matters.
For example, a frustrated Congressman embroiled in a political
dispute with the administration, writing to us that he had been
"misled" by a Cabinet Secretary in a Congressional hearing about
some minor point, could thereby mandate, under the provisions of the
Act, a full-fledged criminal investigative response. Meeting the
standards of the Act required the deployment of teams of FBI agents
and prosecutors to gather documents and conduct investigative
interviews of dozens of witnesses. This would be followed up by
hours of review, legal analysis, and writing and internal consultation,
all to conclude that there was nothing to investigate-when any
sensible prosecutor reviewing such a letter complaining about a non-
covered Assistant Secretary would have reached the same conclusion
on the same day the letter was received. The potential the Act
created for political abuse and manipulation of the criminal justice
system by those opposed to the administration was troubling.
Furthermore, one of the many ironies of the Act, which
illustrates how it warped appropriate and orderly consideration of
criminal allegations, was that far from removing the handling of a
matter from the political realm, by shifting responsibility for decision
making at every stage of a preliminary investigation from career
prosecutors to the Attorney General herself, it required the
participation and intervention of political appointees in the handling
of these sensitive allegations. The Act forced the hands-on, day-to-
day involvement of the entire chain of command up to the highest
levels within the Department to resolve every allegation. This
involvement absorbed countless hours of my time and energies, as
well as that of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney
General-time that frankly could have been far better utilized
addressing the many serious criminal law enforcement problems
facing our nation.
But of course, there were other problems with the Act as well,
problems which cumulatively led to my conclusion, and the
conclusion reached by the Department as a whole, that the Act
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should be scrapped.16 In its announcement of its decision not to
support reauthorization, the Department cited a number of these
problems.17
Primary among them was our overwhelming consensus that the
Act had failed in its primary goal of enhancing public confidence in
the fairness and impartiality of investigations of high government
officials. 18 Indeed, it was our conclusion that the very processes and
procedures of the Act itself had contributed to a sense of cynicism
and negativity among the citizenry during recent years. We also
concluded that far from protecting the process from allegations of
partisan political considerations, the Act did just the opposite.
Virtually every decision associated with the application of the Act
produced partisan criticism and counter-criticism. In the end, the
Department of Justice itself, including its talented career prosecutors,
became the subject of attacks that undermined its core mission of
providing fair, vigorous, nonpartisan law enforcement.
Second, the operation of the Act was crushingly expensive,
absorbing tens of millions of dollars to resolve a handful of criminal
allegations. Whether costs at this astronomical scale are justified
might be open to discussion if the Act met its critical goal of
enhancing public confidence, but since it did not, it was clearly not
cost-effective.
We also noted our concern that the Act tipped the traditional
balance of fairness and restraint at work in the administration of
criminal justice.19 By providing one "target" covered person to
investigate, and removing from the Independent Counsel all
constraints that guide the work of ordinary prosecutors who operate
within the confines of the established, ongoing organizational
structure of the Department of Justice, the Act inevitably created
subtle, and not-so-subtle, changes in the decision making process.
The notion may have been best captured by a remark attributed to
Mark Twain, who once said: "to a man with a hammer, a lot of things
look like nails." The Act even pointed out the "nail" to the person
handed the hammer.
Finally, we expressed our concern that the categorical approach
of the Act led to its application in situations far beyond the stated
justification for its enactment.20 By listing covered persons and
setting such a low threshold for the sort of information that would
cause the procedures of the Act to kick in, the statute swept within its
16. See Holder, supra note 6, at 2; Reno, supra note 6, at 4-5.
17. See Holder, supra note 6, at 2; Reno, supra note 6, at 4-5.
18. See Holder, supra note 6, at 2; Reno, supra note 6, at 4-5.
19. See Holder, supra note 6, at 6; Reno, supra note 6, at 6-8.
20. See Holder, supra note 6, at 6-7.
very cumbersome and expensive scope far more than those few
situations in which it might reasonably be presumed that there would
be a conflict of interest for the Department.
Others agreed with the conclusion we reached, and faced with a
near-total lack of interest or enthusiasm for the continuation of this
flawed experiment, Congress let the Independent Counsel Act lapse
when it expired on June 30, 1999. Except for the continuation of
active Independent Counsel investigations that were ongoing on that
date, the experiment was over.
H. A New Approach
As I pointed out earlier, however, we had learned at least two
important lessons from Watergate. The first was that there are
indeed some matters that the Department of Justice cannot itself
credibly or properly investigate. The second was the importance of
having an established procedural framework in place to handle these
rare situations, so that we are not left in the position of scrambling to
set up an acceptable ad hoe alternative under the pressure of a crisis.
Taking these two lessons to heart, the Attorney General signed new
regulations into effect on June 30, 1999 establishing procedures to
govern situations where she concludes that an investigation by the
Department itself would constitute a potential conflict of interest, and
that the public interest would be served by an outside investigator.21
As the Department was in the process of drafting the new
regulations, it received a number of suggestions. The one designed to
appeal most to present and former Assistant Attorneys General for
the Criminal Division was the one offered by Common Cause. This
proposal, as described in an August 3, 1999 letter to Attorney
General Reno would have "automatically locate[d] prosecutorical
authority over all cases, including high-level matters, with career
prosecutors operating under the final authority of the Assistant
Attorney [for the Criminal Division]."22 Former Watergate Special
Prosecutor Archibald Cox also endorsed this idea in a letter he sent
to Michigan Senator Carl Levin, noting as justification that: "In
recent decades the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal
Division, although appointed by the President, has invariably been an
experienced professional without strong political ties or
obligations." 23  Under Professor Cox's statutory proposal, the
21. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1-600.10 (2000). See also, Office of Special Counsel, 64 Fed.
Reg. 37,038-37,042 (1999).
22. Letter from Donald J. Simon, Executive Vice President & General Counsel,
Common Cause, to Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice 3 (Aug. 3,
1999) (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
23. Letter from Archibald Cox to Michigan Senator Carl Levin (on file with author).
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decisions of the Assistant Attorney General concerning the
investigation and prosecution would have been final in all cases
"subject to reversal by the Attorney General if he or she believes the
decision is plainly wrong-but only if so expressed in a public
statement giving the reasons." 24 As appealing as this idea might have
been to me and others who served as Assistant Attorneys General for
the Criminal Division, the idea did not, as they say, have "legs"-no
doubt for the very reason recognized by Common Cause in the letter
making the proposal: "legitimate questions could be raised about
whether vesting discretion in the Assistant Attorney General
adequately ensures real independence-and importantly, public
confidence grounded on the appearance of real independence-in the
investigation of the President and other high-level officials."2' 5
The regulations reflect a new emphasis on a return to political
accountability and a reliance on the constitutional system of checks
and balances that underlies our form of government, with each
branch of government ultimately answerable to the people. They
reflect the judgment that turning to an outside counsel is essentially
an act of political leadership by the Attorney General in
extraordinary situations where there is a conflict of interest for the
Department and the public interest would be served by having
someone outside the Department investigate the matter. At the same
time, they provide that she cannot shed the ultimate accountability to
the people for the responsible handling of the matter. They also
constitute a frank acknowledgment that there is no perfect solution
under our constitutional system to the problem of an apparent
conflict of interest created by the close relationship, whether political
or institutional, between the Department of Justice and some of those
whom it might find necessary to investigate.
Unlike the assumptions built into the former Act, we do not
believe that the situations that warrant looking beyond the
established investigative and prosecutorial procedures of the
Department can be readily identified and described in advance.
Therefore, we built a great deal of flexibility and discretion into the
regulations, so that different situations can be dealt with in a way best
suited to each situation. For example, the regulations eliminate the
rote listing of covered persons relied upon in the Act, eliminate the
artificial time periods imposed by the Act, and eliminate the
restrictions on use of various normal investigative techniques imposed
by the Act. Instead, they rely on a determination by the Attorney
General that a particular situation first, would create a potential
conflict of interest for the Department of Justice, and second, that the
24. Md
25. Simon, supra note 22, at 4.
public interest would be served by having an outsider handle the
matter.2
6
The regulations go on to set out specific criteria for the selection
of a Special Counsel.27 It is our view that the selection of the
appropriate person may be the most important decision the Attorney
General makes under the regulatory scheme, and the criteria we set
out reflect our view that the success of the process will largely depend
on the qualifications of the individual selected. The regulations
require that "[a]n individual named as Special Counsel shall be a
lawyer with a reputation for integrity and impartial decision making,
and with appropriate experience to ensure both that the investigation
will be conducted ably, expeditiously and thoroughly, and that
investigative and prosecutorial decisions will be supported by an
informed understanding of the criminal law and Department of
Justice policies. '"28
This is the first safeguard for a fair and independent investigation
that is built into the regulations. A Special Counsel of the stature and
experience articulated in the regulations, with no vested interest in
the Department of Justice, no long-term job at stake, and no political
identification with or antipathy toward the administration will have
credibility with the public. It will be clear to all fair-minded observers
that such an individual would not tolerate any inappropriate
interference with his or her investigation. An appropriate
background investigation and conflicts of interest examination is an
established part of the selection process,29 and while full-time
employment is not mandated for all Special Counsels, each Special
Counsel must agree that the investigation he or she has agreed to
undertake will come first in his or her professional life, and that a full-
time commitment may be necessary in the course of the
investigation.30
The regulations contemplate that a Special Counsel's jurisdiction
will be articulated as a specific factual statement of the matters to be
investigated.31 It is intended that these jurisdictional statements
should be limited, factual, and specific, to avoid the frequent
complaint that Independent Counsel investigations have been open-
ended and wide-ranging, going far beyond the original reasons for the
appointment. We are well aware that criminal investigations
sometimes develop in unexpected ways, and therefore a flexible
procedure is set out for the Special Counsel to obtain needed
26. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.1.
27. See id § 600.3.
28. Itt
29. See id § 600.3(b).
30. See iL § 600.3(a).
31. See id. § 600.4(a).
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adjustments in jurisdictional authority from the Attorney General 32
The regulations require that Special Counsels conduct their
investigations in accordance with established Department of Justice
policies, practices, and procedures3 3 This is intended both to ensure
that the investigation is handled, insofar as is possible, in the same
way and under the same standards as would be any other criminal
investigation, and to ensure that the long-term institutional interests
of the Department of Justice are preserved through the application of
consistent policies and practices.
At the same time, the Special Counsel is expressly guaranteed
freedom from any day-to-day supervision. 4 He or she is free to
structure the investigation as he or she wishes, and to pursue the case
by any appropriate means. The regulations provide that should she
deem it necessary in extraordinary circumstances, the Attorney
General may request an explanation for a Special Counsel's decisions,
and may overrule the Special Counsel.35 This provision reflects our
conclusion that experience with the Independent Counsel Act teaches
that unfettered discretion vested with a prosecutor subject to no
oversight or supervision is unwise, and that ultimate accountability
for decisions made with respect to the enforcement of federal
criminal law must be returned to the constitutional officer responsible
for such matter, the Attorney General, who is in turn answerable to
the American people for her decisions.
Inappropriate or improper interference with the Special
Counsel's work, should any such occur, would be dealt with, as it
should be, through the established processes of political
accountability and constitutional checks and balances that exemplify
our system of Government. Accountability is enhanced by an explicit
commitment in the regulations to report any situations in which an
Attorney General overrules a Special Counsel to Congress, insofar as
permitted by law3 6
Special Counsels and their staffs will be subject to the same
standards of conduct as are other Departmental employees.3 7
However, inquiries into allegations of misconduct or unethical
behavior by Special Counsel will occur only at the direction of the
Attorney General.38 Removal of a Special Counsel, should such ever
be necessary, requires good cause, and the personal action of the
32. See id § 600.4(b).
33. See id § 600.7(a).
34. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(b).
35. See hL
36. See id.; 28 C.F.R. § 600.9(a)(3).
37. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(c).
38. See id-
Attorney General. 39
Addressing another major deficiency of the Independent
Counsel Act, future Special Counsel investigations will operate under
an established budget, developed by the Special Counsel and
approved by the Attorney GeneraL40  The discipline and fiscal
accountability provided by operating under an established budget is a
hallmark of good government, and is a principle we concluded should
be extended to these investigations.
Finally, the regulations contemplate a confidential final report to
the Attorney General, describing for the record the work of the
Special Counsel.41 In addition, insofar as permitted by law and the
exigencies of the investigation, Congress will be notified of the
appointment and jurisdiction of a Special Counsel, the removal of a
Special Counsel, and the conclusion of the work of a Special
Counsel. 42 As I have already mentioned, instances in which the
Attorney General finds it necessary to overrule a decision by a special
counsel will also be reported to Congress, enhancing the Attorney
General's political accountability.
Conclusion
Having outlined the specifics of the regulations, I would like to
return once again to the fundamental principle that guided us in
drafting these regulations. In an area that we freely concede presents
extraordinarily difficult issues that may have no perfect solution, we
sought to achieve a responsible, workable balance between the
competing goals of independence and accountability. We devoted
considerable thought, in consultation with Congress, to establishing
the best accommodation of the competing interests at stake, building
in appropriate checks and balances to ensure both accountability and
sufficient independence to reassure the public that the investigation
has been full and fair. Now it is time to give these regulations a
chance to work, to enable us to assess how well they fulfill our goals.
39. See id. § 600.7(d).
40. See id. § 600.8(a)(1).
41. See id. § 600.8(c).
42. See id § 600.9(a)(1)-(3).
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